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HOLBROOK V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

[S. F. No. 18263.

In Bank.

[37 C.2d

May 25, 1951.]

C. RAY HOLBROOK, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents.
[1] Schools- Teachers and Other Employees- Tenure Law.- A
school board's assignments of duties to a school employee make
up the "position or positions" to which the tenure law applies,
and if all or some of the duties require certification qualifications, he holds a position requiring such qualifications within
former Sch. Code, § 5.500, which provided, with certain exceptions, that such an employee should be classified as a permanent employee if, after serving three years in· a "position or
positions" requiring such qualifications, he is reelected to such
a position. (See Ed. Code, §§ 13081, 13201.)
[2] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-Part time
employment of a school employee in a position requiring certification qualifications during the probationary period will result in the right to permanent employment on a part time basis
only, and the same result follows where the local board of
education employs one person in two part time positions involving substantially different kinds of services, only one of the
positions being certified. (See Ed. Code, § 13842.)
[3] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Status.-The relation between a district board of education and one elected by the
board to serve as business manager and principal of a high
school is that of employer and employee, and is created by
contract.
[ 4] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-The tenure
statutes do not make the relation between a school employee
and the district board of education any the less one originating 'in contract, but annex to contracts of employment, when
repeated for a sufficient number of times, certain legal consequences.
[5] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employment.-During the first three years, the status of one employed
by a district school board is fixed, insofar as permitted by statutes, by the formal contracts, the board's resolutions of appointment and its rules and regulations.
[1] Teachers' tenure statutes, notes, 110 A.L.R. 791; 113 A.L.R.
1495; 127 A.L.R. 1298. See, also, 23 Cal.Jur. 132; 47 Am.Jur. 388.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13] Schools, § 83; [3]
Schools, § 81; [5-8] Schools, § 88; [11] Schools, § 105(1); [14]
Schools, § 106 (1).
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[6] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employment.-That one elected by a district school board as business
manager and principal of a high school is employed for one
full time position rather than two part time positions is evidenced by, among other things, the board's resolutions and
notices indicating the employment to be in a full time position
as business manager and principal (later business manager and
director of adult education), the employee's performance of his
education work and business work as it arose, regardless of
whether he was then in the board office or at school, and by
payment of a single, unapportioned salary.
[7] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Contracts of Employment.-A business manager and principal (later business manager and director of adult education) of a school is not necessarily employed in two different part time positions merely
because the employing board's regulations separately list
duties of business managers and principals, where the regulations do not purport to define a full time position, or indicate
that employment of one person to handle the duties under both
headings results in two positions, or define duties relating to
adult education, and where his duties include administrative
work not ordinarily pertaining to any specific office.
[8] Id. -Teachers and Other Employees- Contracts of Employment.-The appointment of a person as principal of a high
school subsequent to the election of another as principal and
business manager does not tend to show that such other had
been occupying two part time positions, where the district
supervisor's letter to him shows that the employment contemplated direction of adult education and included being principal, and where the subsequent appointee's testimony indicates
that he was appointed, not to take over a part time position,
but to assist such other with adult education work.
[9] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-A school
employee who is elected by a district board of education for
three consecutive years to a full time position, some of the
duties of which require certification qualifications, is entitled
to a permanent full time employment in the district if he is
reelected for the fourth year to such a position.
[lOa, lOb] Id.- Teachers and Other Employees- Tenure Law.N otwithstanding the fourth year contract of a school district's
employee, who, for the three previous years, had been elected to
a full time position carrying duties requiring certification qualifications, calls for only one quarter permanent tenure, it is
ineffective to evade the tenure laws, and, on being reelected for
the fourth year to a position requiring performance of substantially the same duties, he is thereafter entitled to full time
permanent employment in the district.
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[11] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Mandamus-Evidence.
-In a mandamus proceeding to compel a district school board
to reinstate an employee to his prior position and to employ
him as a full time employee in a position requiring certification
qualifications of a proper grade, his testimony, as to his protest
of his fourth year contract as calling for only one quarter
permanent tenure, is material.
[12] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-The failure of a district school board to classify as a full time permanent employee one who is by law entitled to such classification
does not prevent him from attaining such status, since the
classification inures by operation of the statutes.
[13] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees-Tenure Law.-Although
a business manager and director of adult education of a high
school may in his fourth year become entitled to full time permanent employment in the district, in view of Ed. Code,
§ 13089, it does not follow that he is entitled to continue in
an administrative position similar to that he held, but he is
entitled to be classified as a permanent classroom teacher.
[14] !d.-Teachers and Other Employees--Mandamus to Compel
Reinstatement.-Mandamus lies to compel a district school
board to reinstate an employee to his prior position and to
employ him as a full time employee in a position or positions
requiring certification qualifications of a proper grade, where
he establishes that he had been employed in such position or
positions requiring such qualifications for three consecutive
years, and that he was reelected to such position or positions
for the fourth year, and that he is entitled to a full time permanent position in the district.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel reinstatement and reemployment of petitioner to position of business manager of
a school district. Judgment denying petition reversed with
directions.
K. R. McDougall for Appellant.

Tanner, Odell & Taft, Robert A. Odell, Gardiner Johnson
and Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Appellant.
Hardy, Carley & Brenner and John M. Brenner for Respondents.
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CARTER, J.--This is an appeal on an agreed statement
from a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate.
Respondents are the the Board of Education of the Palo Alto
Unified School District, the individual members of the board,
and the superintendent of schools of the district. Appellant,
claiming full-time tenure rights by virtue of his full-time
employment in the school district for seven consecutive school
years, seeks to compel respondent board to reinstate him to.
his prior position and to employ him as a full-time employee
of the district in a position or positions requiring certification
qualifications of a proper grade. The board contends that
appellant has acquired no more than "one-fourth time tenure"
and the trial court so held.
At all times pertinent appellant held valid life elementary
and secondary teachers' credentials and a valid life general
administrative certificate. On August 1, 1940, respondent
board adopted a resolution that appellant "be elected Business
Manager and Principal of the Evening High School to succeed
Mr. Charles L. Suffield ... and that he serve as other certificated employees on a probationary basis for three years.''
The following day the district superintendent of schools
addressed a letter to appellant which contained the following:
''At a special meeting of the Board of Education held on
August 1st you were on my recommendation elected Business
Manager and Director of Adult Education, which includes
being Principal of the Evening High School, to succeed Mr.
Charles L. Suffield resigned, at a salary at the rate of $3,000
a year, and your service shall be thought of in the same relation as other certificated employees who serve under the rules
of the Board on a three-year probationary basis."
On August 8, 1940, pursuant to section 5.403 of the School
Code (now Ed. Code, § 13004), the secretary of the board
gave written notice to the county superintendent of schools
that the school district had employed appellant ''to render
service in a full time position requiring certification qualifications, in the following capacity: Business Manager and
Principal of Evening High School-he has been classified by
this board as a probationary employee.''
Appellant testified that he performed the following business
management duties during the school year 1940-1941:
Directed the accounting for the school system and the issuing
of purchase orders and other financial contracts; supervised
the making of the monthly payroll for all district employees;
directed the management of the cafeteria; took care of
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school funds collected through the principals and set up an
accounting plan concerning such funds; made a continuous
study of the types of equipment and supplies required in the
school system, kept inventories thereof and directed the storing and distribution of such items; took care of the business
documents and records; directed the work of custodians,
gardeners and maintenance men and selected persons to do
. such work; had charge of the school district transportation
system; helped make the budget and administered it; assisted
the district superintendent in drafting and revising salary
schedules and rules and regulations; planned and conducted
school elections; furnished information to the school employees and others on matters of school law, salary reduction,
retirement system, income tax procedures and group insurance
claims; made claims for reimbursement from the state and
federal governments for special activities such as child care
centers, adult education activities, and the cafeteria.
Appellant also testified that the evening high school provides classes for adults; that the duties of the principal of that
school involve scheduling classes for adults, selecting teachers,
making reports to the state and superintendent, and general
direction of the adult education program. Holbrook and his
secretary, Mrs. Young, testified that appellant had to interview prospective teachers.
The agreed statement recites that appellant was employed
for the school year 1941-1942 to serve as "Business Manager
and Principal of the Evening High School." No contracts
were issued for that year and there were no minutes of the
board showing his election. He performed the same duties as
in the first year and also started what was called the National
Defense Training Center-a program for training adults for
war production. With another man selected as principal of
the center, appellant had to do the preliminary organizing
work, select the teachers, make rules and regulations, and direct the program in general. The center involved from 15
to 20 teachers and the training of 400 to 500 men every day.
It was operated 24 hours a day during the war years.
On May 7, 1942, respondent board adopted a resolution that
appellant "be employed as Director of Adult Education and
Business Manager for the school year 1942-1943 at an annual
salary of $3840.00." Appellant accepted a formal offer of
employment which was in the following form (italicized portions indicate blank spaces as filled in) :
"You are hereby notified that at a meeting of the govern-
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i1~g board of Palo Alto Unified School district held May 7,

full time

J942, you were elected to serve as a

Business Manapart time
ager & Director of Adult Educ. for the school year beginning
July 1, 1942 and ending June 30, 1943.
''The following conditions of employment have been stipulated by the governing board and are hereby expressly made
a part of this contract: . . .
'' 4. You are hereby classified by this board as a probationary employee, subject to acceptance of this offer."
Neither the words "full time" nor "·part time," preceding
the title of the position, was crossed off. The notice of employment sent to the county superintendent was the same as that
of August 8, 1940, quoted above. During the year 1942-1943
appellant served as director of adult education and a Mr.
Ruppel served as a part time principal of the evening high
school. Otherwise, Holbrook's duties were the same as in
the preceding year. Ruppel entered the armed forces in
November, 1943, and appellant served as principal until February, 1944. Thereafter a Mr. Stone was principal of the
evening high school until Ruppel's return on February 1,
1946. Ruppel testified that he has been a full time principal
since his return; that appellant, as director of adult education, has been his immediate supervisor during all the time
that he, Ruppel, has been principal.
Respondent board passed a resolution on May 13, 1943, that
appellant "be elected to devote three-fourths of his time as
Business Manager and one-fourth of his time as Director of
Adult Education for the school year 1943-1944," the fourth
consecutive year of appellant's employment in the school district. The following day the district superintendent sent a
letter to appellant, stating:
''At the regular meeting of the Board of Education held
May 13, 1943, you were elected to serve as an employee of the
Palo Alto Unified School District for the school year 1943-1944
in the following capacity-one-fourth time as director of
adult education, and three-fourths time as business manager.
The annual salary voted you was $4020.00."
Appellant's letter of June 3, directed to the board, accepted
his appointment "in accordance with your notice of May
37 C.2d-ll
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14th." Holbrook signed a formal contract on June 5, which
stated (blanks filled in with italicized words and figures):
''You are hereby notified that at a meeting of the governing
board of the Palo Alto Unified School district held May 27,
fall time
1943, you were elected to serve as
one-fourth time
paFt time
as Director of Adult Education-three fourths time as Business Manager (non-certificated) for the school year beginning
July 1, 1943, and ending June 30, 1944.
''The following conditions of employment have been stipulated by the governing board and are hereby expressly made
a part of this contract :
'' 1. Your annual salary for the school year in the above
named position will be $4200.00 . . .
"4. You are hereby classified by this board as-Threefourths time as Business Manager (Non-Certificated)-a permanent one-fourth time as Director of Adult Edtteation employee, subject to acceptance of this offer . . . ''
A letter from the district superintendent read as follows:
''Enclosed is your offer of employment for the school year
1943-1944. Your assignment will be one-fourth time as Director of Adult Education for which you will be paid $1050.00
per year, and three-fourths time as Business Manager, for
which you will be paid $3150.00 per year. This makes a total
annual salary of $4200.00 . . .
"As Director of Adult Education you are classified as a
one-fourth time permanent employee. In that the position
of Business Manager requires no certification, you are employed three-fourths time as a non-certificated employee."
Appellant's testimony was that when he received this contract he went to see the district superintendent and told the
latter that ''the contract was not in harmony with the minutes
in two respects: first, it says that the meeting was held on
May 27th, when the meeting was held May 13th; and there
was no authorization in the minutes for the Board to give me
a contract that said only one-fourth permanent tenure, that
I had understood that I had been elected to a full-time permanent position on May 13th . . . and he agreed with me, but
he said that 'Your argument is that the contract is not important anyway, if it doesn't agree with the minutes, so why
fuss about it,' and after discussing it at some length, . . . I
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concluded, since they were not attempting to remove me
at that time, to let the matter ride [until] they attempted to
remove me from my position . . . '' On motion of respondents,
this testimony was stricken and appellant assigns that ruling
as error.
Other testimony by appellant was that in 1943-1944 (the
fourth year) he performed the same services as in the prior
year, except that he acted as district superintendent of schools
in July, 1944, and, in 1943, he began a study of a proposed
junior college. He also served as principal of the evening
high school from November, 1943, to February, 1944.
Appellant's contracts for the following three school years
(1944 through 1947) recited that he was "elected to serve
as full time Business Manager (% time)-Director of Adult
Education ( l;,i time),'' and that he was classified as ''a permanent (% time) employee." In these years appellant continued with the same duties, except that the junior college
study was finished in the year 1944-1945 and the war training program was completed in 1945-1946.
Additional testimony by Holbrook was that he worked at
the high school plant during the evenings and at the board
of education office in the daytime; that he could only be
present at the high school in the evenings, so that he had to
carry his adult education work over to the board office and
do a great deal of it over there; that, in a similar manner,
he would take some business work to the evening school; that
there was no definite place where he performed any particular
type of duties. Mrs. Young also testified that, insofar as
she knew, appellant took care of the various phases of his
duties as they came up.
There was no particular conflict in the evidence with respect to appellant's performance of the foregoing duties. Mrs.
Young and Dr. Almack, a member of respondent board from
May, 1935, to May, 1945, corroborated appellant's testimony
to some extent. Dr. Almack testified that administrative employees did certain acts at the request of the district superintendent, although such services had not been officially ordered
by the board; that Holbrook performed some services which
had not been officially authorized in the minutes of the board
and the board accepted those services. With respect to appellant's claim that he served as acting superintendent and had
chief responsibility for preparing the school budget, there was
conflicting testimony.
AppelJant testified that the printed form on which notices of
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his employment were given to the county superintendent of
schools was used for certificated employees. Throughout his
employment, Holbrook's salary was paid by means of one
school warrant per month without any indication thereon of
any apportionment of salary.
On August 21, 1947, respondent board resolved to discontinue appellant's services as business manager as of September 1, 1947, and to employ him for one-fourth time only to
direct adult education. Appellant then instituted the present proceeding to compel his reinstatement to full time employment in the district.
As amended in 1941 ( Stats. 1941, ch. 558, p. 1936), section
5.500 of the School Code read as follows:
"Every employee of a school district of any type or class,
except a joint union or union high school district with an
average daily attendance of 850 or more, maintaining eight or
more schools lying not less than six miles apart, who, after
having been employed by the district for three complete consecutive school years in a position or positions requiring certification qualifications, is reelected for the next succeeding
school year to a position requiring certification qualifications
shall, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, at the commencement of said succeeding school year be classified as and
shall become a permanent employee of the district. . . . '' The
second paragraph of this section contained the same provision
with respect to employees of the excepted class of joint union
or union high school districts.
The Palo Alto Unified School District has had an average
daily attendance of more than 850 pupils at all times pertinent
to this case and it is conceded that appellant's rights are governed by section 5.500. The Education Code went into effect
in August, 1943 (Stats. 1943, ch. 71, p. 310), and sections
13081 and 13082 of that code were substituted for the first
two paragraphs of section 5.500 of the School Code.
Other pertinent statutes were:
Section 5.430 of the School Code (now Ed. Code, § 13034) :
''No person shall be employed as principal of a school of six
or more teachers, including the principal, unless he is the
holder of a valid teacher's certificate and a valid school administration certificate of the same grade as the school to be administered.''
Section 5.470 (now Ed. Code, § 13049): "No one shall be
employed to supervise the work of teachers for more than half
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time during any school week unless he is the holder of a valid
teacher's certificate authorizing him to teach in the schools
and classes in which he is to supervise instruction and a valid
supervision certificate.''
Section 5.471 (now Ed. Code, § 13050): "The holder of a
valid school administration certificate may supervise general
instruction in all subjects.''
The trial court found that appellant's duties were substantially as claimed by him with certain exceptions; that the
duties of "the position of Business Manager" were of a kind
and nature substantially different from the duties of principal
of the evening high school and those of director of adult
education. It was found as a fact and· concluded as a matter
of law that three separate and distinct positions were involved.
Other findings were that none of appellant's duties as business manager required the supervision of the work of teachers,
nor did such duties require the supervision of general instruction in all subjects; that some of his duties as director of adult
education required the supervision of general instruction in
all subjects; that appellant was required to, and did, devote
one fourth of his time to the duties of director of adult education and three quarters of his time to the duties of business
manager for the years 1943-1944 through 1946-1947; that he
is and was able and willing to render full and satisfactory
service to respondent board in a position or positions requiring certification qualifications.
It was concluded that none of appellant's duties as business
manager required certification qualifications; that the position of principal of the evening high school did require such
qualifications; that some of his duties as director of adult
education required certification qualifications; and that by
virtue of his employment for one-fourth time as director of
adult education for the school year 1943-1944, appellant was
entitled to classification as a permanent one-fourth time employee of the school district, but he was not entitled to permanent full time employment.
Appellant contends that he held one full-time certificated
position in the school district, whereas respondents take the
view that the contrary determination of the trial court is a
finding of fact which is supported by the evidence and that,
in any event, the trial court correctly held as a matter of law
that three separate positions were involved because of the
different nature of the services required by employment in the
different capacities.
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Our attention has not been directed to any decisions or
statutory provisions dealing with the main question presented
·in this case. The soundness of the reasoning in the few decisions attempting to define the term ''position or positions requiring certification qualifications,'' as found in former section
5.500 of the School Code, supra, may be considered somewhat
questionable in view of the number of statutory amendments
which have changed the law with respect to the points actually
decided in such cases. (See note, 24 Cal.L.Rev. 441, 442,
setting forth the changes effected by the 1935 amendments to
the School Code with references to prior decisions.)
In Cullen v. Board of Education (1932), 126 Cal.App. 510
[15 P.2d 227], the petitioner had been assigned to duty as a
teacher in day high school classes for eight years and as an
evening school instructor for six years when he was dismissed
from the latter function. In compelling his reinstatement,
it was said (pp. 512-513): "The power of the Board of Education to assign its employees to these various duties is not
questioned and when such assignments have been made they
must be taken as making up the 'position, or positions' to
which the Tenure Law applies.
''Here it is admitted by the demurrer that petitioner served
as teacher in both day and evening schools for a period of more
than six years prior to his dismissal, and that his total period
of service in any one day did not exceed eight hours. We are
inclined to hold that these assignments constitute but one
'position' within the meaning of the Tenure Law and that
petitioner, having served in that 'position' for more than the
probationary period, has become automatically re-elected to
that position.''
Anderson v. Board of Education (1932), 126 Cal.App. 514
[15 P.2d 774, 16 P.2d 272], involved similar facts with the
exception that the petitioner had served as principal of the
evening school. In reinstating him to that office (and holding
that he had acquired tenure as such under the provisions of
the San Francisco charter), the court stated (pp. 520-521) :
''In this connection we should add that we are not impressed
with respondents' insistent argument that our judgment
grants double tenure to these teachers and principals. . . .
[W] e must interpret the word 'position,' as used in the school
law and in the charter, as applying to the 'employment' of
the individual. If they were officers the term 'position' would
be interpreted with greater strictness as to the term, duties
and place of employment. But, generally speaking, these
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factors do not control the relation of master and servant, or
employer and employee. The latter may be assigned to such
duties within his employment as the employer may designate.
Here the employer assigned the employee to teach in two
separate school buildings and permitted him to continue in
that service beyond the probationary period and to become
classified as a permanent employee-not for a part of the
service only-but for all. The tenure, therefore, runs to a
position of employment, or service, of equal grade and rank
to that to which the statutory classification has applied. . . . ''
In denying a hearing in these cases, this court withheld
approval from the portion of each opinion "which holds that
the two employments of petitioner constitute but one position." (126 Cal.App. at pp. 513 and 521.) Such a holding
was unnecessary to the decisions, in that, assuming the petitioners held two part-time positions, they had acquired tenure
in both capacities and were entitled to permanent full-time
employment.*
In Mitchell v. Board of Trustees (1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 64
[42 P .2d 397], the petitioner had taught for four hours a
week in the evening school, in addition to teaching full time
in the day high school. The trial court entered judgment restoring him to his "two positions." It was held that the reinstatement of the petitioner to his evening school employment
was error. The court stated (pp. 69-70) : "In effect, the petitioner seems to contend that he acquired one position as a
teacher in the regular high school and another and different
position through his work in the evening high school. In
Cttllen v. Board of Education, supra, the court was inclined
to hold that teaching part of the time in a day school and part
of the time in an evening school constituted but one position.
In drnying a hearing the Supreme Court withheld its approval
of that proposition. It is unnecessary to decide that qurstion
here since this petitioner had, in any event, acquired permanent status as a full-time teacher in the day school . . . .
"While a permanent status may be acquired throug-h service in one or more positions, we think the status when acquired cannot apply or relate to anything in excess of the
regular and ordinary full-time employment of a teacher. We
take it that these tenure laws, at most. give to a teacher a
right to continue in fulJ-time employment without arbitrary
*For the present provisions with respect to service in hoth day and
night schools, see section 13086 of the Education Code.
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dismissal, and that they were not intended to apply to or
cover any extra work which goes beyond the usual full-time
employment.''
Since Holbrook is not claiming anything more than the
right to permanent full time employment, the Mitchell case is
not helpful.
Former sections 5.710 and 5.711 of the School Code,* which
authorized the dismissal of permanent employees of a school
district when that becomes necessary "on account of th~
discontinuance of a particular kind of service in such district," were considered in Walsh v. Board of Trustees (1934),
2 Cal.App.2d 180 [37 P.2d 700]. The teacher, a permanent
employee, had taught vocal music four periods a day in the
senior high school and the same subject in the junior high
school for two periods a day. Upon the discontinuance of the
teaching of vocal music in the senior high school, the petitioner
contended that he was entitled to full-time work in the junior
high school in preference to a probationary teacher. In disposing of this contention, the court commented (pp. 182-183) :
''The main queRtion here is whether the discontinuance of
teaching vocal music in this senior high school while the
teaching of the same subject was continued in the junior
high school is 'a discontinuance of a particular kind of service in the district' within the meaning of the statute. A
closely related question is whether an employment as teacher
of a certain subject in both a senior high school and a junior
high school, which has resulted in a permanent status, constitutes one position or two positions within the meaning of
the School Code.'' In discussing the difference between junior
and senior high schools, it was said: "[I]t would seem that
a teaching service in two schools which are totally different in
kind and nature, should be held to constitute two positions
rather than one and that the classification statute in question
was intended to and does cover such a situation." (2 Cal.App.
2d at p. 184.) (See, also, Unruh v. Piedmont High School
m.~t., 4 Ca1.App.2d 390, 393 f 41 P.2d 212].)
Respondents contend that thiR case establishes the rule that
an employee of a school distriet oceupies two part-time positions if he is employed to perform two different kinds of servieeR; that. therefore, the trial court correctly held that appellant's employment involved three different positions and that
he acquired only part-time tenure. However, it is evident
*The present statute is section 13651 of the Education Code.
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that the statements of the court with respect to how many
positions were present in the Walsh case were dicta; that the
only question decided was that a particular kind of service
had been discontinued in the district. Moreover, for reasons
hereinafter stated, we are not inclined to follow the concept
expressed in the Walsh opinion-that an employee of a school
district necessarily holds as many positions as the number of
kinds· of duties he is required to perform.
[1] We have concluded that the reasoning set forth in
Cullen v. Board of Education, supra, is sound.* Former section 5.530 of the School Code and the present section 13201
of the Education Code give school boards the power, and make
it their duty, ''to fix and prescribe the duties to be performed
by all persons in public school service in the school district.''
Here, respondent board assigned various duties to appellant,
and, as stated in the Cullen case, supra, page 512, ''when such
assignments have been made they must be taken as making up
the 'position, or positions' to which the Tenure Law applies.''
If all or some of the duties assigned to an employee require
certification qualifications, then the employee holds a position
requiring certification qualifications within the meaning of the
statute; that is, under the statutory provisions, such a position
can only be held by a person having the requisite certificate
or certificates. Neither section 5.530 of the School Code nor
section 13201 of the Education Code requires the local board
to assign only certificated duties to any one employee, and
we are referred to no authority which necessitates a holding
that, upon reelection for the fourth consecutive school year,
an employee of a school district becomes entitled to permanent
status only as to the amount of time devoted to certificated
duties during the probationary period. At least, under the
circumstances here, such a conclusion would be administratively impractical, and would, in effect, deprive certificated
employees of the protection of the tenure laws in cases where
they are required to perform some services which could have
been performed by noncertificated employees. To make the
employee's tenure rights dependent upon the duties assigned
to him for which a certificate was required, allocated according
to time, would mean that the employee would attain permanent
*We are not here concerned with the applicability of that reasoning
to the particular facts of the Cullen case. Neither do we express any
opinion as to whether the present provisions of section 13086 of the
Education Code contemplate part-time or full-time tenure in the Cullen
and Anderson situations.
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status on a part-time basis in every case where, in accordance
with the authority given the local board, he was assigned some
other duties during his probationary period. Obviously, to
one who must earn his living from his profession, such parttime tenure rights would be valueless. In the absence of some
compelling reason, we cannot assume that the Legislature
intended such a result.
That full-time employment normally leads to full-time
tenure if some of the duties allocated to the school district
employee require certification is indicated by the cases arising
prior to the 1935 amendment to section 5.502 of the School
Code, which dealt with the rights of persons employed both
as principals and as teachers during the probationary period.
Prior to 1935, section 5.502 read: "No person employed in an
administrative or supervisory position requiring certification
qualifications shall be classified as a permanent employee
other than as a classroom teacher. . . . '' In construing this
section and its predecessor, section 1609 of the Political Code,
it was held that one employed solely as a principal could not
acquire permanent status (Bland v. Board of Trustees, 67
Cal.App. 784 [282 P. 395]), but that a person employed to
serve both as a principal and as a teacher could acquire tenure.
(Gastineau v. Meyer (1933), 131 Cal.App. 611 [22 P.2d 31];
see Klein v. Board of Edttcation (1934), 1 Cal.2d 706 [37 P.2d
74]; Work v. Central Union H. S. Dist. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d
626 [44 P .2d 1047] . ) The following portion of the opinion
in Gastineau v. 1r!eyer, supra, pp. 615-616, is pertinent here:
''The language of this statute clearly implies that, while
one engaged solely in an administrative or supervisory capacity may not be classified as a permanent principal, yet if at
the same time he also successfully performs the required services as a teacher, he is nevertheless entitled to permanent
tenure 'as a classroom teacher.' . . . We are satisfied that
the law does not authorize permanent classification as a principal or supervisor, but that the act does guarantee permanent
tenure to all other employees, including classroom teachers
who have been successfully employed by the district for two
or three complete consecutive school years in positions requiring certification qualifications, in spite of the fact that such
employee may have been primarily hired as a principal and
actually devotes a part of his time to the performance of the
duties of that officer. Since the respondent was qualified as
a teacher and actually engaged in teaching for the required
length of time and in strict compliance with the requirements
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of the statute, he certainly should not be deprived of his
vested right to permanent tenure as a teacher merely because
he also performed other services at the same time." (Italics
added.)
Apparently it was never thought that such employees could
be reduced to a part-time status, in proportion to the amount
of time required to be devoted to teaching activities as contrasted with other duties, after attaining classification as
permanent employees.
[2] While no authority on the question has been cited,
we may assume that part-time employment in a position
requiring certification qualifications during the period of probation will result in the right to permanent employment on a
part-time basis only,* and that, with the same result, the local
board of education may contract to employ one person in two
part-time positions involving substantially different kinds of
services, only one of which positions is certified. [3] The
relationship between respondent board and appellant is that
of employer and employee and this relationship is created by
contract. (Gould v. Santa Ana H. S. Dist. (1933), 131 Cal.
App. 345, 349-350 [21 P.2d 623] .) In Taylor v. Board of
Education (1939), 31 Cal.App.2d 734, 743 [89 P.2d 148],
it was said : ''The contract can specify the salary, subject to
a statutory minimum, the duties to be performed, the number
of hours per day which the teacher shall perform his services,
the age and class of students which will be taught, and other
details relating to actual employment." (See, also, Rible v.
Hughes, 24 Cal.2d 437, 443 [150 P.2d 455, 154 A.L.R. 137];
Richardson v. Board of Education, 6 Cal.2d 583 [58 P.2d
1285]; Hogsett v. Beverly Hills School Dist .. 11 Cal.App.2d
328 [53 P .2d 1009] ; Wood v. Los Angeles City School Dist.,
q Cal. A pp.2d 400 [44 P .2d 644].) [ 4] The result of the tenure
statutes "was not to make the relation any the less one originating in contract, but to annex to contracts of employment
when repeated for a sufficient time certain legal consequences.''
(Abraham v. Sims, 2 Cal.2d 698, 710 [34 P.2d 790, 42 P.2d
1029] ; see, also, Kacsur v. Board of Trustees, 18 Cal.2d 586,
591 f116 P.2d 593] .)
[5] Insofar as permitted by the statutes, the formal contracts, the resolutions appointing appellant, and the rules
*See section 13842 of the Education Code, prescribing the minimum
annual salary to be paid each person employed in a full-time or parttime position requiring certification qualifications and defining ''full
time.''
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and regulations of the board fix the status of appellant during
the first three years of his employment. (Fry v. Board of
Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 760 [112 P.2d 229].) [6] The
following factors, as detailed above, show that appellant was
employed in one full-time position, rather than two part-time
positions: The resolution of August 1, 1940; the letter of the
district superintendent dated the following day; the notice
sent to the county superintendent of schools on August 8,
1940; the reelection of appellant in the same capacity in 1941;
the resolution, contract, and notice to the county superintendent for the third year; the fact that appellant performed
his various duties as they came up, without reference to time
or place, and that this was necessary by the nature of his
employment; the payment of appellant by a single, unapportioned salary.
[7] Respondents contend that the fact that the regulations
of respondent board separately list the duties of business
managers and principals is evidence upon which the trial
court could base its conclusion that appellant was employed
in two different part-time positions during each school year.
But the regulations do not purport to state what shall constitute a single full-time position and there is no indication that
the employment of one person to carry out the various duties
specified under the different headings should make up two
employments or positions. Also, the fact that the regulations
do not contain any reference to the duties relating to the
direction of adult education, and that appellant's activities
included general administrative work not ordinarily pertaining to any specific office, indicates the fallacy of considering
a position in terms of a title rather than in terms of a group
of duties assigned to an employee.
[8] Neither does the appointment of Ruppel to serve as
evening school principal, first on a part-time basis in 1942
and subsequently for full time, tend to show that appellant
had been occupying two part-time positions. The district
superintendent's letter of August 2, 1940, informing appellant of his employment, shows that it was intended from the
beginning that appellant should direct the adult education
program and that that work should include being principal
of the evening high school. Ruppel's testimony indicates that
he was appointed, not to take over a part-time position formerly held by appellant, but to assist appellant with the adult
education work which appellant continued to do.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that this
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eourt is not bound by the trial court's determination that
appellant held three different positions during the first three
years of his employment in the district and that that conclusion is predicated upon either an erroneous construction
of the words ''position or positions requiring certification
qualifications'' as used in section 5.500, or a misconception
of the terms of appellant's employment as expressed in the
documentary evidence and the testimony, which is generally
undisputed, with respect to the duties assigned to, and performed by, appellant.
[9] Having been elected to a full-time position for three
consecutive school years, some of the duties of which required
certification qualifications, appellant is entitled to permanent
full-time employment in the district if he was reelected for
the fourth year in a position requiring certification qualifications. [lOa] Respondents assert that the resolution in May,
1943, and the contract accepted by appellant for the fourth
year of his employment (1943-1944), and for succeeding
years, demonstrates that two part-time positions were involved, at least beginning with the fourth year. We may assume, without deciding, that such a resolution and formal
contract would have had the asserted effect if they had been
made during· the probationary period. But appellant and
the California Teachers Association in an amicus curiae
brief contend that the form of the fourth year contract was
adopted as a device to evade the full effect of the tenure laws
and should be held ineffectual to accomplish that purpose.
It has been held that resignations of teachers exacted at the
close of their probationary period as a condition of reemployment for the next year in the same capacity are not effective
so as to deny tenure to teachers who in fact continue service
in the school district. (Sherman v. Board of Tntstees ( 1935),
9 Cal.App.2d 262 [49 P.2d 350]; Mitchell v. Board of Trustees
(1935), 5 Cal.App.2d 64, 68 [42 P.2d 397].) The situation
in the present case is substantially similar. The evidence
shows that appellant was required to, and did, perform essentially the same services during the fourth year and thereafter
as in the first three years of his employment. [11] In this
connection, appellant's testimony to the effect that he protested concerning the form of his fourth year contract was
material (Merman v. Calistoga Joint Union H. 8. Dist., 5 Cal.
2d 438 [55 P.2d 195]), and should not have been stricken.
[12] The failure of respondent board to classify appellant
as a full-time permanent employee did not prevent him from

334

HoLBROOK

v.

BoARD OF EDucATION

[37 C.2d

attaining that status, for, as stated in La Rue v. Board of
Trustees, 40 Cal.App.2d 287, at 293 [104 P.2d 689], with
respect to school districts, such as the one involved here:
'' [W] hen by the operation of law a teacher is entitled to
classification as a permanent employee the failure of the
school board to so classify such teacher does not prevent the
classification, but the same inures by operation of the statutes." (See, also, La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal.App. 6, 12-13
l276 P. 377] .) [lOb] Under the circumstances, we hold that
appellant was reelected for the year 1943-1944 to a position
requiring certification qualifications and was thereafter entitled to full-time permanent employment in the school district.
This conclusion is not in conflict with Work v. Central
Union H. S. Dist., supra, 6 Cal.App.2d 626, or Crawford v.
Board of Education, 20 Cal.App.2d 391 [67 P.2d 348], for in
those cases the petitioners did not continue doing the same
work after the expiration of their probationary periods.
[13] It does not follow, however, that appellant is entitled
to continue in an administrative position similar to that held
by him. Section 5.502 of the School Code was amended in
1935 ( Stats. 1935, ch. 690, § 8, p. 1881) to read as follows:
'' . . . Persons employed in administrative or supervisory
positions requiring certification qualifications upon completing
a probationary period, as hereinabove provided, including
any time served as a classroom teacher if any, in the same
district, shall, in districts having an average daily attendance
of 850 or more pupils, be classified as and shall become a permanent employee as a classroom teacher . . . . " This portion
of section 5.502 is now section 13089 of the Education Code
with some slight changes in terminology. While the present
statute makes it clear that a principal or other supervisory
employee need not perform any teaching services in order to
be entitled to tenure, there has been no change in the provision
that such persons become permanent employees as classroom
teachers after the probationary period is served. (See Griffin
v. Los Angeles City H. S. Dist. (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 350
f127 P.2d 939].) Accordingly, appellant is entitled to be
classified as a permanent classroom teacher. This does not,
of course, affect our conclusion that respondent board exceeded
its authority in purporting to reduce appellant to part-time
employment.
The agreed statement recites that the evidence concerning
the amount of salary due appellant has not been included in
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the statement for the reason that it is contemplated that, if
appellant should prevail on this appeal, the case will be remanded to the trial court for a determination of that question.
In .view of this stipulation and the fact that the question has
not been argued on this appeal, no opinion is expressed on the
matter of salary.
[14] The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial
court to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, ,J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 18,
1951.
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THE PEOPI;E ex rel. ALBERT J. LEVIN, Respondent, v.
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA et al., Defendants;
FRED A. WICKETT, Intervener and Appellant.
[1] Counties-Charters.-If an irregularity in the proceedings by
local authorities for the adoption of a county charter appears
on the face of the legislative resolution approving the charter,
the approval of the Legislature is not conclusive, and the
court will examine the regularity of the proceedings and
determine whether or not the constitutional requirements have
been met and whether the document submitted is a valid
county charter.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Charters.-Where it appears on the face of a legislative resolution approving a county charter that in five of
the ten required publications before submission to the electorate a portion of the contents was so garbled as to make
three sections of the charter unintelligible, there is not such a
compliance with constitutional requirements as to constitute
the document a valid charter.
[3] !d.-Charters.-In view of Const., art. I, § 22, compliance with
constitutional requirements with regard to adoption of county
charters (see art. I, § 7Yz), is mandatory and prohibitory.

[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 418.
McK. Dig. :Reference: [1-3] Counties, § 6.

